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ABSTRACT
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN IMPULSIVENESS:
A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
MAY 1992
LISA MARIE BECK, A.B., BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Icek Ajzen
Impulsive behavior is a common theme in psychology,
but human decision making, animal choice, foraging, and
personality research define and measure impulsiveness
differently. The first goal of this study was to
determine how much agreement exists between
impulsiveness measures based on these different
perspectives
.
A review of these literatures suggests that
individual differences in sensitivity to rate of reward
and punishment may be an important factor in impulsive
decision-making. The second goal of the present study
was to investigate this possibility.
College undergraduates (n = 159) responded to a
four-part questionnaire. The first part was a series of
duplex bets that assessed each subject's relative
attention to four risk dimensions: amount to win, amount
to lose, rate or probability of winning, and rate or
probability of losing. The second part of the
vi
questionnaire represented the common definitions of
impulsiveness in decision theory with 2 0 items posing
hypothetical choices between immediate and delayed
rewards. The third part was the 42-item Eysenck
Impulsivity Scale used in personality research.
Finally, subjects responded to a single 7-point self-
rating of impulsiveness, and gave examples of impulsive
and unimpulsive behavior.
The decision theory items and personality measure
of impulsiveness were very weakly related. The findings
suggest that reliability and validity issues with regard
to hypothetical choices of this type should be
investigated carefully before using them in further
research.
Regarding the suggestion that individual
differences in sensitivity to rate account for impulsive
behavior, the results of the study indicate that
impulsive individuals may instead be particularly
sensitive to punishment or cost. When unavoidable cost
is explicitly associated with reward, as in the choices
in the duplex bets and hypothetical choices in the
questionnaire, impulsives weight that information
heavily, but in many everyday decision situations, like
those described in elicited examples, they may actively
avoid cost considerations, which leads to rapid action,
sometimes with objectively negative outcomes.
vii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Esau traded his birthright to Jacob for
a mess of pottage, we have been aware of individual
differences in human impulsive behavior. More formal
study of these differences has been much slower to arise
however, and the fields of psychology and economics are
just beginning to explore the patterns and
inconsistencies of impulsive behavior. The
possibilities for exploration of the concept of
impulsiveness are almost as numerous as the meanings
attached to the term. Impulsiveness has been
investigated in several different areas of psychology,
and from different perspectives.
Two major perspectives will be considered here.
One is that of decision theorists, who are concerned
with universal tendencies to make impulsive choices in
particular situations. The tradition of the "economic
man" has focused on human responses to situational
variables, mainly in terms of money or goods that can be
traded for money. Decision theory has, for the most
part, adhered to that tradition, and concerned itself
with the concrete situational variables that influence
choice
.
On the other hand, personality theory is primarily
interested in stable individual differences in
dispositions or tendencies to behave in certain ways.
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Many of these tendencies are difficult to measure and/or
test experimentally, but there is little question that
humans are susceptible to psychological variables such
as emotions, expectations, and desires, and that these
differ widely for different individuals.
It is important to recognize the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach while exploring what each
has to say about a particular concept, in this case,
impulsiveness. This discussion will concentrate on the
contributions of each perspective to an understanding of
individual differences in impulsive choice behavior.
Impulsiveness in Decision Theory
For most decision theorists, impulsiveness is
defined as the preference of a smaller, more immediate
reward over a larger, more delayed reward (e.g. Logue,
1988; Ainslie, 1974; Rachlin & Green, 1972). Impulsive
behavior in this sense contradicts many of the
assumptions of traditional economic theory, and has
engendered a large body of research in the field of
decision theory. Very little of that literature has
even suggested the notion of individual differences in
decision-making styles, however, much less explored such
differences or incorporated them into theory.
Some paradigms for the study of human decision-
making and impulsiveness will be examined first, then
animal choice research will be reviewed.
2
Human Decision Making
Cognitive Factors. One body of literature relevant
to a discussion of individual differences in impulsive
behavior is concerned with the individual's perceptions
or beliefs about the choice situation. Although
situational factors, such as the context or wording of a
problem, are considered in this literature to govern
cognitive and behavioral responses, only a small stretch
of the imagination is needed to envision a more
egalitarian interaction between individual and
situational factors.
Most decision making paradigms consist of
presenting hypothetical situations to subjects and
giving them a choice of responses. For example,
subjects may be asked to choose between receiving $100
now and receiving $2 00 in two years. Most subjects
choose the immediate reward. Interestingly, if subjects
are given the choice between $100 in six years and $2 00
in eight years, most subjects prefer the larger, more
delayed reward, despite the fact that the distance
between the two rewards is still two years. Preference
reversal (Ainslie, 1975; Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981) , as
this phenomenon is called, is the tendency for a reward
to become more attractive as it becomes more available.
When both rewards are delayed, the relative discounting
of the more delayed reward is small. But as the small
reward becomes closer in time (more available)
,
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subjects' preferences usually shift toward the small
reward. In other words, the subjects' perspective
contributes to decision making.
The class of subjectively expected utility (SEU;
discussed in Abelson & Levi, 1985) models represents a
more explicit acknowledgment of the importance of
psychological variables in decision making. SEU
paradigms commonly require subjects to supply their own
probability estimates for uncertain outcomes, such as
whether it will rain on a particular day, or, given
objective probabilities (such as 80% chance of rain) , to
rate the value of the potential outcomes. Although such
models have been heavily criticized for their failure to
account for actual behavior, SEU is notable in that it
sets the stage for the recognition of individual
differences in assessment of choice situations.
Proposed successors to SEU include portfolio theory
(Abelson & Levi, 1985) , which bases its predictions on
individual differences in risk preference, and prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), in which decisions
under risk are affected by the individual's "framing" of
the problem.
Framing effects are based on an individual's
reference point with regard to a choice. For instance,
when asked to choose between a treatment that will save
200 of 600 epidemic victims, and a treatment which will
allow 400 to die, most subjects choose the first
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alternative, despite the fact that the outcomes of both
treatments are the same. Framing effects have been
demonstrated in more naturalistic experiments, using $7
gift certificates for a record store as reinforcers for
college students (Loewenstein, 1988) . The certificates
were to be delivered to the students in one, four, or
eight weeks. Subjects were then given choices about
trading their certificates for larger, but more delayed
certificates, and smaller, more immediate certificates.
On average, the increased value required by the subjects
for a more delayed certificate was three to four times
the cost they were willing to incur for getting the
certificate sooner. In other words, they were resistant
to delay, but were also relatively uninterested in
speeding up the reward once they had formed an
expectation to receive the certificate at a particular
time. Subjects had framed the problem in terms of the
point at which they expected to consume, and any
deviation from this was relatively undesirable. Framing
effects can result from the wording of a problem on a
questionnaire, for example, or from recent experience
with similar problems (the $5 lost in the first game of
blackjack is more highly valued than $5 lost in the
attempt to recover from an accumulated $100 loss)
.
Framing research provides information about the relative
contributions of reinforcer delay and magnitude in human
impulsive behavior, as well as demonstrating the special
5
contributions of psychological variables such as
expectations
.
One criticism of prospect theory, relevant to the
current investigation and applicable to many decision
research paradigms, is its reliance on "one-shot bets" -
single decision items. Laboratory subjects typically
avoid risky alternatives in one-shot bets. However,
they tended to prefer risky alternatives when the same
bet was to be repeated ten times (Keren & Wagenaar,
1987) . Rachlin (1990) presents a theory which suggests
that strings of gambles affect the subjective valuation
of individual gambles. In other words, although the
value of an individual gamble is objectively negative, a
gambler may perceive it as part of a subjectively
positive series. The idea that many decisions may be
part of a series of other choices will be discussed in
more detail below.
Although the above theories have little or nothing
to say about impulsiveness, and are in many ways
inadequate in dealing with basic choice phenomena, the
movement toward recognizing the contributions of
individual differences and psychological variables is
notable, and relevant to the present discussion.
Emotional Variables . Another recent example of
recognition of the importance of subjective evaluation
in the choice situation is based on temporal
externalities such as regret, rejoicing, disappointment
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(Loomes & Sugden, 1982) , and savoring and dread
(Loewenstein, 1987) which are by-products of decision-
making that have value in their own right. The
experience or expectation of such emotional responses
can explain why people put off pleasurable events or
rush to get unpleasant events over with. Elster (1985)
suggests that impulsive decisions could be the result of
the lack of influence of temporal externalities such as
disappointment and savoring. For example, the emotions
involved in waiting for a delayed reward may be highly
unpleasant for some people, so that settling for a
smaller reward makes up in emotional terms what is lost
in reward quality. The explicit recognition of the
importance of psychological variables, both cognitive
and emotional, in decision research represents an
important broadening of decision theory.
Operant Research in Humans . Another research
direction is rooted in the operant learning tradition.
In this paradigm, human subjects are studied in
experimental situations similar to those used for
animals. This methodology allows for meaningful
comparisons between animal and human results, and for
careful control of experimental variables. Some of the
most rigorous attention to comparability has been
demonstrated by Logue, King, Chavarro, and Volpe (1990)
in recent studies of impulsiveness/self-control
.
Previous studies often used points exchangeable for
money as reinforcers, but this practice can be
criticized as involving a very different kind of
reinforcement from that in animal studies, where a
deprived animal works for immediately usable food. In
Logue et al.'s experiment, food- and water-deprived
college students operated a mechanism to receive a juice
reinforcer. Subjects were given as little instruction
as possible, in order to minimize experimenter effects
and increase the comparability to animal studies. The
mechanism was designed so that alternative responses
would lead to brief, immediate access or longer, delayed
access to the reinforcer. Substantial individual
differences were displayed in subjects' patterns of
responding, i.e., some subjects preferred the self-
control response exclusively, others preferred the
impulsive response, and others showed intermediate
preferences. In a follow-up study, paper-and-pencil
measures of self-control, locus of control, dieting,
desire for the reinforcer, etc. , did not correlate with
impulsive or self-control responses (Bonvino & Logue,
1990) . These experiments are landmarks in two ways.
First, most human research based on operant paradigms
shows consistent self-control responding and little or
no impulsiveness (Logue et al., 1990; for an exception
see Solnick, Kannenberg, Eckerman & Waller, 1980) . The
careful methodology of the experiments of Logue et al.
seems to have removed many of the situational demands
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for a particular style of responding that led to self-
control tendencies in previous studies. Second, these
experiments are unusual in explicitly demonstrating and
discussing individual differences in relation to
impulsive behavior. Although the initial attempts at
finding correlates of individual differences in
impulsiveness did not succeed, Logue, et al.'s
experiments are an important new direction in a field
previously concerned only with situational variables.
Animal Choice Research
Operant Research in Animals . Animal choice
research is useful because it permits extensive
exploration of the influence of different
characteristics of reinforcement on behavior. Models
are proposed, and are supported or refuted by results
from carefully controlled studies of behavior. Human
choice research is in danger of confounding by highly
idiosyncratic cognitive factors and varied past
experiences whose existence and importance are generally
unknown and uncontrolled by the experimenter. In
contrast, animal studies offer an opportunity to control
past experience, and little concern that subjects'
interpretations of the experimental situation might
affect their behavior. Most animal studies are of
course performed with rats and pigeons, although field
and laboratory work on foraging patterns takes advantage
of a wider range of species. Impulsiveness in
particular is a common topic for study. Subjects are
trained to choose between a small, immediate reward and
a large delayed reward. Interestingly, most studies of
this kind show clear evidence of preference for
immediate rewards (Logue, et al., 1990).
There are at least two important exceptions to thi
generality. Pigeons will take advantage of a
precommitting strategy in order to receive a larger
reward (Ainslie, 1974; Rachlin & Green, 1972). In othe
words, they will make a response ahead of time that wil
keep them from having the opportunity to choose the
smaller reward. Notice the parallel between this kind
of choice and the tendency of humans to choose the
larger reward when the choice is made before the smalle
reward becomes available. Also notice that pigeons are
not permitted to terminate the waiting period (to
"change their minds") while waiting for the delayed
reward. If so permitted, they exhibit preference shift
as the small reward becomes available and thus show
impulsive behavior (Logue & Pena-Correal , 1984) . We ma
conclude from such results that pigeons perceive a
difference between the two alternatives, and prefer
larger rewards in general, but are, like humans, highly
sensitive to the availability of the reward.
A second exception is found in a research paradigm
for training pigeons to choose the delayed reinforcer.
This fading procedure is initiated by training the
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animals to associate different keys with large or small
rewards. If given a choice, the pigeons will make the
response associated with the larger reward. The time
between the response and delivery of the larger reward
is gradually delayed, until eventually the pigeon is
exhibiting "self-control". But the argument can be made
that the fading procedure is designed so that, with
gradually increasing delay over thousands of trials, the
animal does not notice the change and perceives only the
original choice between large and small reward.
Therefore, evidence of self-control behaviors in typical
laboratory animals is weak at best. Although
impulsiveness in animals is well-documented, researchers
have yet to develop a general model for describing and
predicting choice behavior in animals.
Matchincf Law . One of the best-known and most
useful models of choice is Herrnstein's (1970) matching
law. According to the matching law, an organism divides
its behavior (B) in proportion to the values of the two
alternatives, where value is determined by ratios
between amounts (A) and delays (D)
.
Bi Ai ^ D2
82 A2 Dl . (1)
This model easily predicts impulsive behavior, as well
as pigeons' use of a precommitting device, and the
preference shift exhibited when the choice is made
further away in time from the point of small reward
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delivery. However, sometimes behavior deviates from the
strict matching law above in the form of bias
(preference for one behavior when the two outcomes are
identical) or undermatching (behavior ratio is closer to
1 than the parameters predict) . Such deviations are
better accounted for by a generalized version of the
matching law (Logue, 1988)
:
Bl
= k
B2
Al
A2
SA
X
D2
Dl
SD
(2)
k represents response bias and is constant for a given
animal and a given apparatus. SA and SD are exponents
which represent the sensitivity to differences in amount
and delay, respectively. If an animal shows preference
for the small immediate reward in a situation where the
strict matching law predicts preference of the larger,
delayed reward, the generalized matching law could
describe this result by saying that SA > SD.
Logue, Rodriguez, Pena-Correal , and Mauro (1984)
demonstrate that these exponents can be affected by
experience, and thus differ across subjects. Pigeons
who had experienced a fading procedure showed more self-
control responding on new problems than control pigeons.
The faded pigeons were more sensitive to differences in
amount, and less sensitive to differences in delay than
were control pigeons. Individual differences in
sensitivity to the two characteristics of the reinforcer
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accounted for in this model are thus recognized as an
important factor in impulsive behavior.
Foraging Theory
. The foraging literature offers
additional evidence regarding impulsive choice behavior
in animals in the wild. An interesting example of
different foraging strategies across species is found in
two desert rodents, the kangaroo rat and the pocket
mouse (reviewed in Olton, Handelman, & Walker, 1981)
.
The kangaroo rat forages mainly on large clumps of seeds
at long distances from its burrow, while the pocket
mouse chooses the "impulsive" pattern of foraging on
individual seeds found near its burrow. These animals
have never been studied in operant paradigms, yet the
similarity of their choices between small, immediate vs.
large, delayed rewards to similar choices in the
decision literature is striking.
Although most foragers work to increase amount of
food, some, including the pocket mouse, appear to do
this through a strategy of rate maximization. For
instance, titmice in the wild must catch an insect every
three seconds throughout a winter day just to survive
(Krebs, 1978) . In an experimental situation, the birds
prefer exclusively a response with the highest reward
rate. When size of prey and rate of encounter are
manipulated, many animals are more influenced by rate of
encounter than predicted by optimal foraging theories.
In addition, studies of different species show that many
13
animals prefer immediate rewards (Krebs, 1978) . in a
natural setting, reward immediacy often signals likely
frequency of further encounters with the prey, so when
animals make "impulsive" choices, they may be increasing
not only rate, but amount of total reinforcement as
well
.
Survival concerns leading to different rate
preferences may be found in humans as well. Severely
impoverished people might prefer a small, immediate
amount of money or food to a delayed, larger reward,
simply because they may not survive to collect the
delayed reward. People in this situation are
demonstrating sensitivity to the possible frequency of
reward. Begging brings in a small, but steady, amount
of money and searching for a job may result in a long-
term advantage, but the job rewards may be too distant
to be relevant to today's needs. Therefore, choosing to
beg may show a sensitivity to rate that is adaptive
under the circumstances.
So far the discussion of impulsiveness in animals
and humans has suggested that impulsiveness may result
from the evolutionary or social circumstances of the
individual or species. However, individual differences
in human impulsiveness may not always be based on such
obvious distinctions. Some well-off people are
impulsive with regard to food and money when survival is
not an issue; some poor people exhibit self-control
14
despite situational demands to the contrary. The highly
varied environmental and genetic contributions to
individual personalities engender differences in
impulsiveness not attributable to the characteristics of
a particular situation.
Rate as a Variable in Decision Literature
There are typically five characteristics of reward
and punishment considered in the animal and human
decision literature: delay, rate, probability,
magnitude, and quality. Most investigation has
concentrated on interactions between delay and magnitude
of reward (e.g. $100 now vs. $200 later; 2 pretzels now
vs. 5 pretzels later). Although a few researchers have
studied interactions of delay and reward/punishment
quality (e.g. pretzels now vs. cookies later; grass here
vs. fruit 2 00 yards away) these interactions are not
easily compared with delay-magnitude interactions.
Thus, magnitude and quality are usually equated in the
literature, if quality is considered at all.
Probability of reinforcement is often included in
experiments with humans (e.g. Stevenson, 1986;
Loewenstein, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982),
and is incorporated into many models of human decision
making. Rate, delay, and probability are closely
related and easily confounded, so care must be taken
when investigating and interpreting their effects (see
Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon & Frankel, 1986)
.
15
Typically, rate of reinforcement is controlled for
in animal choice experiments, and not addressed in human
choice studies. A pigeon may be given a choice between
a small, immediate reward and a large, delayed reward
once every 60 seconds. Choosing the immediate reward
will not speed up the beginning of the next trial, so
although the magnitude of rewards in a training session
is affected by the animal's choices, the number of
rewards and spacing of trials remains constant. On the
other hand, optimal foraging theories recognize the
importance of rate, as well as the close connection
between delay and rate. In optimal foraging models,
rate of consumption for a certain prey type is
determined by several time factors
,
including rate of
encounter in the environment, and time spent in handling
and preparing the prey for consumption.
Logue (1988) suggests the following, more general,
time periods: C, the period during which choice
responses are made; D, the period between the end of the
choice period and the start of access to reinforcement;
A, access to reinforcement; and T, a postreinforcer
delay period before the next C. Handling time is not
included in Logue 's description (Houston & McNamara,
1988) , but may be appropriately included in D, the delay
before consumption, or A, for cases in which handling
and preparation are themselves reinforcing. For
example, receiving a paycheck and depositing it in the
bank is pleasant for many people, despite the fact that
the money cannot be "consumed" until the check has been
processed. Following Logue's definition, rate (1 / C +
D + A + T) is a broader representation of the time
variables involved in choice than simply delay, and
should be incorporated into models of repeated choice
situations
.
Probability, mentioned above, can also usefully be
subsumed under rate. In a probability paradigm with
repeated choices, some of the expected A's will not
occur, effectively extending the T from the last trial.
In their discussion of "probability as rate," Rachlin et
al. (1986) reason that probability information forces
human subjects to treat a one-shot decision as if it
were a series of choices, with proportional frequencies
of outcomes. Probability information is provided
directly to animals on a variable rate schedule (e.g., a
food pellet is delivered once for every three lever
presses, on average) , while humans must infer rate of
reinforcement from a single piece of information (33%
chance of winning) . To take a more common example, when
the weather report indicates a 3 0% chance of rain, we
know that in the past, it has rained on one out of three
days with the same weather conditions. Knowing there is
a low probability of rain is no help when we're caught
in a downpour. It seems likely that most choices made
by humans are not isolated, but exist as part of a
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series of other choices (cf. Rachlin, 1990). Therefore
rate should be considered more carefully as a
determinant of human decision making.
What is missing when probability is described in
terms of rate (and is also missing in foraging models)
is the frustration resulting from the absence of an
expected A. The potential for punishing consequences
such as frustration and pain (getting rained on, missing
a picnic) is likely to influence choices made by animals
and humans, and, along with individual differences in
rate preferences, should be included in models of choice
behavior.
Impulsiveness in Personality Research
Whereas individual differences in impulsiveness
have been largely neglected in animal choice and human
decision research, individual differences in the ability
to tolerate delay have been the focus of much
personality research. The relevant work of Mischel,
Eysenck, and Gray is considered here.
Delav of Gratification
Mischel 's delay of gratification paradigm is based
on a definition that matches the decision literature's
definition of impulsiveness. Mischel demonstrated
differences in children's ability to delay
gratification, in other words, to resist temptation to
fulfill a desire immediately in order to get a larger
18
reward later (Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Shoda, & Peake,
1988; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989).
Cognitive and attentional processes used by
subjects to sustain delay of gratification are explored
in Mischel 's work. in particular, children who are able
to wait for the larger reward tend to use strategies for
occupying themselves with thoughts other than those
about the consummatory properties of the reward.
Subjects who thought about the "hot" aspects of the
reward were much less likely to wait. Such emotional
and cognitive factors seem relevant to a discussion of
impulsiveness, but, except for recent work by
Loewenstein cited above, have been neglected in decision
theory and research.
Central in Mischel 's work is an explicit interest
in individual differences in delay of gratification, and
dispositional correlates of self-control have also been
investigated. For instance, four-year-olds who prefer
delayed rewards tend to be more intelligent, more
socially responsible, more resistant to temptation, and
more ambitious. Ten years later, these children are
described by their parents as being more competent
academically and socially than their peers, more able to
cope with frustration and resist temptation, more self-
assured, verbally fluent and expressive, and planful
(Mischel, Shoda & Peake, 1988; Mischel, Shoda, &
Rodriguez, 1989). Preschool delay times were also
19
significantly related to SAT scores. These results
suggest that the experimental situation left ample room
for relevant individual differences to act on behavior,
and that these differences are related to many aspects
of behavior, as well as being temporally stable.
As mentioned above, Mischel's paradigm relies on
the familiar choice between a small, immediate
reinforcer and a large, delayed reinforcer. it has
something else in common with decision theory, however:
a lack of attention to rate preferences. Mischel's
research has been criticized on the grounds that
subjects who make the "impulsive" choice not to delay
are in fact responding to the chance to get out of the
experiment early and obtain extraexperimental rewards.
This argument leads to the possibility that "the child
is sensitive to the rate of access to extraexperimental
rewards" (emphasis added; Sonuga-Barke, 1988, p. 694).
Mischel attempted to make clear to his subjects that
their choice would not affect how much time they spent
in a playroom after the experimental situation, but it
is likely that some children (assuming they all fully
understood the instructions) may have wanted to get out
of the experimental room and into the playroom, then
home, as quickly as possible.
Despite Mischel 's findings of stable individual
differences and correlates relating to behavior in a
delay of gratification paradigm, the generalizability of
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single instances of behavior must not be assumed.
Single behaviors tend to be unstable, so one-time
choices made by subjects in decision paradigms may be
inappropriate measures of stable individual differences.
This is especially likely if the choice is not
particularly engaging or realistic, as is often the case
(Epstein, 1983). Although Mischel's paradigm appears to
have been successful in tapping behavior that correlated
with relevant variables over a long period of time, it
is still possible that the correlated measures were all
determined by a stable third factor, such as family
environment (Mischel, 1974). Such concerns leave room
for doubt as to the usefulness of Mischel 's paradigm as
a definitive test of impulsiveness. The better method
of investigation would involve aggregating behaviors in
many situations over time to detect behavioral
dispositions (Epstein, 1979; 1980). The aggregate
measure would then be useful for testing theories about
the origins and implications of choice behavior.
Impulsiveness as a Combination of Traits
Mischel 's work represents a well-known paradigm for
exploring the links between individual difference
variables and impulsive behavior. Others have developed
theories which propose a general structure of
personality relevant to impulsiveness. In this
research, impulsiveness is not clearly defined, but
usually refers to a broad trait or combination of
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traits, often including extraversion, with implicit or
explicit references to risk-taking, non-planning,
thoughtlessness, and irresponsibility.
Eysenck and Eysenck (1977) responded to criticisms
of the use of the term impulsiveness in personality
research to refer to several apparently different
constructs, such as risk-taking, sociability, or
disorderliness. Eysenck and Eysenck compiled
questionnaire items from several scales designed to
measure impulsiveness, and performed a factor analysis
on responses from over two thousand subjects. The
"impulsiveness" items were factored into four
components. "Narrow impulsiveness" is a definitional
scale characterized by items (such as "Do you often do
things on the spur of the moment?") aimed at tendencies
to act on impulse. The "risk-taking" factor includes
items such as "Would life with no danger in it be too
dull for you?" The "non-planning" factor includes items
such as "Do you like planning things carefully well
ahead of time?" (reverse scored) , and the "liveliness"
factor is characterized by "Can you put your thoughts
into words quickly?" and other questions relevant to
speed in decision-making.
The four factors were correlated with the three
major personality dimensions of psychopathy (P)
,
extraversion (E) , and neuroticism (N) as measured by the
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1975). Narrow impulsiveness and nonplanning
were related to N, risk-taking was related to both P and
E, and liveliness was related to both E and N. Further,
a 13-itein sociability scale was compiled from relevant
items in the EPQ, then correlated with the four
impulsiveness factors as well as the combined
impulsiveness measure. All four factors correlate
positively with sociability (.18 to .39). The authors
concluded that impulsiveness is indeed composed of
several distinct elements, but that these elements
correlate with each other and with sociability such that
they belong to a set of traits making up the higher-
order trait of extraversion.
A direct application of the Eysencks' findings
about impulsiveness to decision-making has not been
made, but it is clear that the four factors of the
impulsiveness scale imply certain decision-making
styles: failure to plan ahead, risk-taking, speed in
taking action, and acting on sudden impulse. It seems
worthwhile to investigate the relation between the
Eysencks' impulsiveness measures and traditional operant
and decision theory paradigms. The standard tests of
preference for a small, immediate reward over a large,
delayed reward can be correlated with performance on the
Eysencks' impulsiveness scale, although, as discussed
above, correlation would be limited by the difficulties
in predicting specific behaviors from global attitudes.
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It should be noted that Eysenck, while
participating in research on impulsiveness and other
primary traits, disapproves of putting a great deal of
emphasis on such work. For Eysenck, a trait such as
impulsiveness is merely a combination of P, E, and N,
dimensions which are consistently found in factor
analytic studies, and for which well-developed theories
exist. Eysenck (1987) concludes that except for
"certain specific purposes", concentration on specific
traits rather than general dimensions is "essentially
counterproductive" for understanding personality (p.
492)
.
One of Eysenck' s great contributions to
personality psychology has been the simplification of
personality dimensions to two or three comprehensive
dimensions. Therefore, it is not surprising that he
should prefer to concentrate on these major dimensions.
However, for present purposes it is useful to extend
Eysenck 's work to provide better understanding of
impulsiveness
.
Sensitivity to Reward vs. Punishment
Gray's (1981, 1987) revision of Eysenck's
personality theory contains an intriguing model of
impulsive behavior. The model is based largely on
differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment.
People who are high on the extraversion and neuroticism
dimensions are relatively insensitive to punishment and
highly sensitive to reward. This leads to risk-taking.
venturesomeness, and nonplanning, in other words,
impulsiveness. In contrast, high-neuroticism introverts
are more sensitive to punishment than reward and tend to
display anxious behaviors (see Figure 1) . The model has
received support from studies showing that extraverts
respond best to a conditioning paradigm when reinforced
with reward, while introverts respond best when
reinforced with punishment (cited in Gray, Owen, Davis &
Tsaltas, 1983; also Wolfe & Kasmer, 1988).
However, no studies have been conducted to
demonstrate differences in decision-making based on
personality variables and perceived outcomes of the
decision. Gray's model predicts that extraverts would
Introverted EKt'Overted
D Susceptibility to reword
Q Susceptibility to punishment
Figure 1. Gray's proposed relationships of (a)
susceptibility to signals of reward and punishment to
(b) the dimensions of introversion-extraversion and
neuroticism (Gray, 1981).
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tend to ignore potential negative outcomes of a decision
while weighting positive outcomes more heavily, in other
words, would take risks. This prediction is of course
reversed for introverts. Decision research has
demonstrated that subjects typically prefer risk when
facing loss (e.g. prefer 90% chance of losing $1000,
otherwise nothing, to 100% chance of losing $900) , and
make cautious decisions when expecting gain (e.g. prefer
100% chance of winning $900 to 90% chance of winning
$1000, otherwise nothing; discussed in Abelson & Levi,
1985) . However, the minority who do take risks in the
gain situation have never been studied to find out why
they chose as they did, nor have any other dispositional
variables been considered.
How can an exploration of rate preferences be
applied to Gray's analysis? First, impulsiveness, with
its components of extraversion and neuroticism, and
correlation with sociability, might be viewed as social
risk-taking - speaking one's mind without considering
the consequences, interacting nonselectively with many
people, being willing to try new activities and
situations. Impulsive individuals may be maximizing the
rate of social contacts, thereby experiencing more
successful interactions. The corresponding increase in
failed interactions is ignored or discounted by these
punishment-insensitive individuals. On the other hand,
introverted individuals high on neuroticism are
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oversensitive to punishing interactions, and attempt to
minimize punishment by reducing the number of social
interactions. Successful interactions are ignored or
discounted, and so are of little use in changing the
anxious behavior. Individuals between the two extremes
take both punishment and reward into account, and behave
so as to maximize reward and minimize punishment.
Therefore, by moving one step further to elucidate rate
preference in conjunction with sensitivity to reward vs.
punishment. Gray's theory becomes a convenient framework
on which to build an understanding of impulsive
behavior.
Impulsiveness; A Potential Integration
The preceding discussion encompasses a broad range
of theory and research. Some important elements of the
reviewed literature are summarized below. A model
designed to integrate these elements is proposed, and
finally, a study testing some hypotheses related to the
model and the literature is described.
Preference for Efficient Decision Strategies
Humans and animals have limited processing
capacities, and tend to choose decision strategies that
will maximize the ratio of reward to effort. In other
words, they prefer to get the most reward for the least
effort, and may be unwilling to use a complicated
strategy that optimizes outcome when a simple strategy
leads to satisfactory results. This "satisf icing"
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tendency (Simon, 1976, discussed in Janis and Mann,
1977) permeates human decision making, and is closely
related to cognitive economy (Glass & Holyoak, 1986) and
heuristic bias (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982)
effects observed in human perceptual and social
judgments. The implication of this generalization for
choice behavior is that individuals may develop a
consistent pattern of sensitivity to the characteristics
of a choice situation which allows for efficient
processing and satisfactory outcomes in most cases.
Individual Differences in Sensitivity to Characteristics
of the Choice
Gray's (1981, 1987) revision of Eysenck's
personality theory rests largely on individual
differences in sensitivity to reward and punishment.
According to Gray, individuals who are relatively
insensitive to punishment tend to take risks and act
without planning, in other words, behave impulsively.
The opposite of the impulsive individual in Gray's model
is one who is highly sensitive to punishment; he
characterizes such an individual as anxious.
Generalized matching laws (e.g. Logue, 1988) also
incorporate the notion of differences in sensitivity to
different aspects of a choice situation. Although the
generalized matching law has not been used explicitly to
discuss individual differences in behavior in the way
that personality and social psychologists understand
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them (but see Logue, Rodriguez, Pena-Correal
, and Mauro
1984, for experimental manipulation of individual
differences in pigeons' self-control responding), it
provides a useful model for describing choice behavior.
Neglected Variables
Typically, impulsiveness is described in decision
research as a behavioral reaction to two variables,
amount and delay of reward. But other research suggest
that additional variables may be necessary for a
complete description of impulsive behavior.
Rate. Foraging models and research suggest the
importance of rate of reward, rather than the more
specific delay term. Some animals are almost
exclusively sensitive to the frequency of encounter of
prey in the environment, and in controlled tests are
found to ignore aspects such as size of prey in favor o
a high rate of encounter (Krebs, 1978; see also Olton,
Handelman & Walker, 1981 for related phenomena in the
wild) . As for rate sensitivity in humans, Sonuga-Barke
(1989) has suggested that subjects behaving
"impulsively" in Mischel's well-known delay of
gratification paradigm (for a review see Mischel, Shoda
& Rodriguez, 1989) were maximizing the rate of
(extraexperimental) rewards by choosing a smaller but
immediate experimental reward. In other words, some
subjects preferred to take the smaller reward and leave
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the experimental situation altogether rather than wait
for the larger reward.
As Sonuga-Barke noted, an apparently isolated
choice may be followed by access to a new set of
choices. Even in an experimental situation, subjects
may obtain extraexperimental rewards through exploring
the room or cage, or by daydreaming. Therefore, while
choices might be limited in an experimental situation,
humans and animals are more frequently faced with the
potential of maximizing rate of reward, where making an
impulsive choice results in a small reward, as well as
quick access to new choice (and reward) situations.
Rate preferences are, in theory at least, always
applicable in decision making, although the distinction
between R and D may be troublesome in some laboratory
situations.
Probability of reinforcement can also be subsumed
under the rate term if it is viewed as the failure of an
anticipated A to occur. The use of the rate term serves
to simplify as well as clarify the variables used in
choice equations. The possibility that human impulsive
behavior is an attempt to maximize rate of reward is
explored in the current study.
Punishment . The role of potential punishment in
choice behavior has been neglected in the decision and
foraging literatures. Although costs involved in
consumption are considered (such as energy expended in
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hunting, or money spent on a vacation)
,
truly aversive
consequences such as being bitten by a prey, or breaking
a leg on the first day of a ski trip, have been ignored.
The subjective probability of such consequences, and
their anticipated aversiveness could be expected to
influence choices about which prey to hunt, for
instance, or whether to go skiing. As noted above,
Gray's model calls for an assessment of sensitivity to
punishment as well as reward. Time, effort and injury
or other loss are all potential punishing outcomes even
for a successful endeavor. In addition, frustration
resulting from the nonoccurrence of an expected reward,
mentioned above, turns probabilistic rewards into a
source of punishment. Punishing factors should be taken
into account in any general model of choice, and, as
Gray suggests, may be especially relevant to a
investigation of impulsiveness.
A Model of Impulsive Choice Behavior
The assumptions and generalizations just described
can be integrated in the following model:
Bi Qi+ Qi- Ri+ Ri-
= wl + w2 + w3 + w4
B2 Q2+ Q2- R2+ R2- • (3)
Bi and B2 refer to the impulsive and nonimpulsive
behavioral alternative. Qi and Q2 refer to the relative
quality or quantity of the rewarding (+) or punishing
(-) consequences associated with each behavioral
alternative. Ri and R2 are defined as 1/(C + D + A +
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T)
,
and express the rate of the rewarding ( + ) or
punishing (-) outcomes associated with each behavioral
alternative. Individual differences in sensitivity to
these four dimensions of outcomes are described by the
weights for each term.
This model differs from the generalized matching
law in several ways. The reasons for substituting rate
for delay and adding terms for punishing consequences
are explained above. Note that the ratios for punishing
consequences are not inverted, as in the generalized
matching law, as the signs associated with the weights
will indicate the direction of each term's effect on
behavior. The model is represented by a linear equation
for three reasons. First, the exponential
representation of the sensitivity terms in the
generalized matching law is better supported by
convention than by data (Chapman, 1988) . Second, until
there is evidence of a nonlinear relationship, the
simpler description of choice data may be the most
appropriate. Third, the new model is partly based on
Slovic and Lichtenstein's (1968) regression model for
evaluating bets. A replication and variation of their
study is included in the present study, and the above
model provides a convenient way to describe the results.
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1.
A Paradigm for Determining Individual Dif ferf^nr.f^s -in
Sensitivity to choice Characteristi
The explicit statement of a model of choice
behavior raises the important question of how the model
can be tested. Fortunately, Slovic and Lichtenstein
(1968) developed a research method which assesses many
of the factors of interest in the current discussion,
and which can be modified to test model (3) more
explicitly.
Slovic and Lichtenstein' s (1968) investigation
assessed subjects' attractiveness ratings of a series of
duplex gambles. The task was designed to eliminate the
confounding present in many earlier studies attempting
to determine the relative importance of individual
components of a bet. Duplex bets allow the
probabilities of winning and losing, as well as their
respective payoffs, to be independent.
In Slovic and Lichtenstein' s study, the bets were
presented on discs, one for wins and one for losses.
The subject must (hypothetically) spin each disc to
determine the outcome of the game. In each game, it was
possible for the subject to both win and lose, lose and
not win, win and not lose, or neither win nor lose. An
example of the stimuli used is presented in Figure 2 (p.
34; see appendix A for the complete set of items).
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WIN $1 LOSE $1
WIN 0 LOSE 0
Figure 2. Example of stimuli used in Slovic and
Lichtenstein's (1968) duplex gamble task.
Probability of winning and probability of losing
(PW and PL) occurred at three levels: .2, .4, and .8*
Amount to win and lose ($W and $L) also occurred at
three levels: $1, $2, and $4. Combinations of the risk
dimensions resulted in 27 different bets to be rated,
with an average expected value of zero. (Note: Slovic
and Lichtenstein report equivalent results using all
possible combinations of risk dimensions (81 bets) and
with 21 , which is the next smallest number of bets
allowing for equal representation of all dimension
levels.) For instance, the bet in figure 2 can be
described as follows:
PW = .4 PL = .2
EV = $.20
$W = $1 $L = $1
Subjects rated the attractiveness of each bet on a
scale of -5 to +5. Subjects were also required to
submit bids for the opportunity to play each game.
Comparison of bidding results with rating results showed
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the same pattern of responding, leading Slovic and
Lichtenstein to suspect that bidding involves a two-
stage process. The subject determines how much he or
she would like to play the game, then translates the
game's attractiveness into monetary units. For Slovic
and Lichtenstein, then, ratings and bids were equally
useful for determining the subject's evaluation of a
game. In the current study, only attractiveness ratings
were obtained.
Slovic and Lichtenstein correlated subjects'
attractiveness ratings with the levels of each of the
four risk dimensions across the 27 bets. Regression
analysis was used to determine each subject's weights
for the four risk dimensions. Slovic and Lichtenstein
found notable individual differences in weighting
patterns. The responses of many subjects were
overwhelmingly determined by one or two of the risk
dimensions, while large changes in the less important
factors had little effect. These differences are
evident in the comments elicited from subjects at the
end of the study. Following are two examples: "I
decided wholly on the basis of amount to lose"; "I found
playing the bets most desirable only when I had an
excellent chance of winning. . . didn't pay much
attention to the amount I would win or lose." (Slovic
and Lichtenstein, 1968, p. 10).
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Each subject's weights are correlated with measures
of impulsiveness obtained in the other questionnaires,
described below. Expressed as a special case of the
proposed model (3), the equation tested by the Slovic
and Lichtenstein variation is as follows:
Attractiveness of B = wl(Q+) + w2(Q-) + w3 (R+) + w4(R-)
(4) since the variation involves a rating of a single
behavior rather than a choice between behavioral
alternatives
.
Their investigation followed from two ideas that
are similar to the generalizations on which model (3) is
based. The first is "importance beliefs", described as
follows: "when a person evaluates a bet, he pays more
attention to some risk dimensions than to others because
he believes that these particular dimensions are most
important for his present decision" (Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1968, p. 1). Note that the proposed model
(3) of impulsive choice in this paper is based on a
similar assumption, except that instead of evaluating
the dimensions of every choice situation, subjects in
the new conception are believed to possess more stable
individual differences in sensitivity to dimensions of
choice situations. In other words, individuals tend to
display a similar pattern of sensitivity to dimensions
of choice in a variety of choice situations.
The second idea noted in Slovic and Lichtenstein
(1968) is that a person's capacity for employing
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importance beliefs may be limited. Stress, time
constraints, or amount of information available may lead
the decision maker to neglect or overuse some items of
information. Both of the above considerations result in
sensitivity to choice information that differs according
to the individual's beliefs and the current choice
situation. The present research focuses on stable
individual differences in patterns of sensitivity which
lead to differences in impulsive choice.
Research Plan and Hypotheses
Several hypotheses are tested in the current study.
Most generally, it is expected that individual
differences in sensitivity to different dimensions of a
choice situation exist. In keeping with the above
discussion, impulsive individuals are expected to a) be
highly sensitive to rate of reward, and b) be relatively
insensitive to potential punishment. Conversely, the
least impulsive individuals should be a) relatively
uninterested in rate of reward and b) highly sensitive
to potential punishment. The least impulsive
individuals, that is, those who are at the opposite
extreme from impulsives, may share impulsives' higher
sensitivity to rate, in which case we expect
nonimpulsives to be highly sensitive not only to
punishment, but to the rate of potential punishment in
particular. Comparison of subjects' weights choice
dimensions and correlations between the weights and
other impulsiveness measures tests the hypothesis that
rate information is relevant to human decision making
and that probability is merely a special case of rate.
Furthermore, the agreement between different
measures and definitions of impulsiveness is tested
using the results of three questionnaires as well as the
subject^s self-report of impulsiveness. The first
questionnaire assesses, using Slovic and Lichtenstein's
procedure, each subject's weighting of the dimensions of
choice situations. The second is a measure of impulsive
choice using items based on the decision research
definition of impulsiveness (preference of small,
immediate to large, delayed reward) . The third is the
EIS, a 42-item impulsivity questionnaire. Finally,
subjects respond to the question "I am an impulsive
person" on a 7-point true-false scale, and give examples
of impulsive and non-impulsive behavior. Given the
greatly different definitions on which the impulsiveness
scales are based, close agreement is unlikely.
Comparison of scores on the scales with each other and
with subjects' self-reports and examples of
impulsiveness provides insight into the definition of
impulsiveness and the value of the measures tested.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Questionnaire
Duplex Gamble Task: Rate Variation
The present study replicated Slovic and
Lichtenstein's (1968) study in order to assess
individual differences in attention to four risk
dimensions of a bet. In addition, a variation of Slovic
and Lichtenstein's procedure in which rate of winning
and losing was substituted for probability was
introduced.
^
In the current study, a variation of the Slovic and
Lichtenstein (1968) procedure was used to examine
subjects' sensitivity to rate of winning and losing
rather than probability of winning and losing. In the
rate version, subjects were told that each of the 27
games represented an hour of play, and they rated the
attractiveness of each game. Rate was determined by the
hypothetical spin of a disc which had six divisions to
1 A pilot study was devised to test whether the
amount of money to be won and lost should be changed to
keep up with 20 years of inflation since SL's study, and
to determine which of three levels of rate intervals
should be used in the rate version of the duplex gamble
task. Although differences between the versions were
small, there appeared to be more individual differences
in weighting of risk dimensions for the bets in which
the amount of money to be won or lost was $10, $2 0 and
$40, and for the rate intervals of one to five minutes,
two to ten minutes, and four to 2 0 minutes, than for
longer rate intervals.
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indicate the number of minutes the subject would wait
before winning or losing the indicated amount, then
spinning again.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the subject was faced
with one win disc and one loss disc for every game (see
appendix B for the complete set of items) , as for the
probability version. At the beginning of "play", both
discs are spun simultaneously, then each disc is spun
independently depending on the previous outcome. Three
WIN $10 LOSE $40
Figure 3. Example of stimuli used in rate version of
duplex gamble task.
different ranges of rate were expressed by the discs.
The range of five delays found on each disc introduced
some uncertainty into the expected delay, and forced
subjects to develop their own heuristics for play by
making it difficult to calculate the expected gains and
losses over an hour of play. In other words, subjects
were less likely to simply determine the expected value
of each game and translate that into an attractiveness
rating. (No such precautions were taken in the Slovic
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and Lichtenstein design, and no information is provided
as to whether any of their subjects used or reported
using the expected value strategy.)
The average delays for the three rate discs were 3
minutes, 6 minutes, and 12 minutes. The ratio of delays
on the rate discs was the same as the ratio of
probabilities used by Slovic and Lichtenstein, that is,
1:2:4.
Decision Research Items
A group of items based on hypothetical choices like
those used in decision making research were used. All
of the items involved an element of delay; a subscale of
nine items was intended to specifically represent
choices between small, immediate and large, delayed
rewards. Some items were written for the present
investigation, some have been used in published
research, and others were based on actual choices or
examples discussed, but not tested, in the decision
literature. Many of these items were not originally
formulated with regard to an investigation of individual
differences in impulsiveness, but were included because
they could be expected to relate to impulsive decision
making. Most research done with this type of item
merely indicates the percentage of subjects choosing
each alternative, and is not concerned with correlates
of choice. The following is an example of the items:
"You have just won a contest. You can either receive
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$100 now, or $200 at a later time. What is the longest
you would be willing to wait for the $200 prize?" (See
appendix C for the complete set of items, their origins
and scoring.
)
Evsenck Impulsivitv Scale
The Eysenck Impulsivity Scale is a compilation of
items designed to measure impulsiveness taken from
several personality inventories. Under factor analysis,
the items break down into four factors: definitional
items comprising "narrow" impulsiveness (e.g. "Do you
often do things on the spur of the moment?") , risk-
taking (e.g. "Would life with no danger in it be too
dull for you?")
,
nonplanning (e.g. "Do you like planning
things carefully ahead of time?", and carefreeness (e.g.
"Can you put your thoughts into words quickly?") . (See
appendix D for the complete set of items.)
Self-report of Impulsiveness
Finally, subjects provided a self-report of
impulsiveness, as well as behavioral examples of
impulsiveness and unimpulsiveness. Subjects also
provided personal information (sex, age, class, GPA, SAT
scores, major) to be correlated with the other measures
on the questionnaire. Mischel's findings (Mischel,
Shoda & Peake, 1988; Mischel, Shoda & Rodriguez, 1989),
suggest a correlation between academic performance and
impulsiveness, which will be tested. (See appendix E
for complete set of items.)
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Subjects
Subjects were 159 University of Massachusetts
undergraduates, who received experimental credit for
their participation. Forty of the subjects were male,
118 were female, and one subject did not indicate sex.
The subjects were recruited from psychology classes
where they heard a brief description of the study and,
if interested in participating, received a questionnaire
with instructions for completing and returning it.
Approximately 70% of the questionnaires distributed were
returned.
Procedure
Eighty-seven of the subjects rated the
attractiveness of 27 duplex gambles in a replication of
Slovic and Lichtenstein' s (1968) study, and 72 rated 27
bets in which probability of winning or losing was
replaced by rate of winning or losing. Subjects
received written instruction for completing the rating
tasks properly. They were asked to indicate starting
and finishing times for the rating task to investigate
whether speed of task completion is a useful correlate
of impulsiveness. After completing the probability or
rate version of the duplex gambles, all subjects filled
out the other questionnaires in the following order:
decision research items, Eysenck Impulsivity Scale,
self-report of impulsivity, behavioral examples of
impulsiveness and nonimpulsiveness, and personal
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information. Self
-report and behavioral examples were
completed at the end to avoid sensitizing subjects to
the idea that they were being tested for impulsiveness,
and to prevent their responses to other items from being
colored by their own definitions of impulsiveness.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Subject Characteristics
There were no significant differences between
probability and rate versions on background variables
such as age, sex, and SAT score. Table 1 displays the
mean (SD) for each background variable for subjects
completing the rate and probability versions, separately
and combined. On average, subjects were about 20 years
old, in their third year of college, had a grade point
average of 3.0, and combined SAT score of 1078.
Seventy-five percent were female.
Table 1
Subject Characteristics: Mean (SD) for Probability and
Rate Versions. Separately and Combined.
Probability Rate Combined
(n=87) (n=72) (n=159)
Age 20.48 (2.91) 20.74 (4 . 19) 20.60 (3.55)
Sex (1=M, 2=F) 1.79 (.41) 1.69 (.46) 1.75 (.44)
Year in school 2.49 (1.08) 2.69 (.93) 2.58 (1.02)
GPA 2.95 (.54) 3.06 (.45) 3.00 (.50)
SAT score 1065.70 (133.71) 1092.03 (131.07) 1078.00 (132.65)
Reliability and Intercorrelations of EIS
and Decision Scales
Alpha reliability coefficients for the four
subscales of the EIS are as follows: .79 for the
definitional scale; .65 for risktaking; .59 for
nonplanning; and .57 for liveliness. Alpha reliability
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for the entire scale is .84. Reliability coefficients
are reported on the diagonal of the correlation matrix
in Table 2 (p. 45)
.
The four subscales of the EIS were significantly
correlated with each other and with total EIS score.
These correlations ranged from .26 to .81 (median =
.42). Similar patterns of intercorrelations has been
observed in earlier investigations (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1977; Beck, 1989). Intercorrelations between the
subscales are displayed in Table 2 (p. 45) .
Standardized item alpha reliability for the 20-item
decision scale was .50. Nine items representing the
definition of impulsiveness as preference for a small
immediate vs a large delayed reward had an alpha
reliability of .40. (See Appendix C for the items
making up this scale.) Reliability coefficients are
reported on the diagonal of the correlation matrix in
Table 2 (p. 47) . Reliability of these scales is itself
an issue and will be discussed in the next chapter.
Dimension Weights
For both the probability and rate versions of
Slovic and Lichtenstein' s (1968) task, subjects'
attractiveness ratings were correlated with the levels
of each of the four risk dimensions across the 27
gambles. Regression analysis (described in Chapter I)
was used to determine each subject's weights for the
four risk dimensions. Following Slovic and
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Lichtenstein, individual differences in weighting
patterns are apparent in that on average, a subject's
highest weighting of a dimension is more than twice the
size of his or her lowest weighting. For the
probability version, the average maximum weighting was
.58, and the average minimum weighting was .18. For the
rate version, the average maximum weighting was .53, and
the average minimum weighting was .25.
Subjects' attractiveness ratings were also
correlated with the expected value for each gamble. For
the probability version, correlations ranged between -
.31 and .89, with median .64. For the rate version,
correlations ranged between -.22 and .86, with median
.66. It is interesting to note that some subjects
marked the questionnaire with what appeared to be
expected value calculations. However, either because
they did not do the calculations properly, or because
translating a calculated expected value into an
attractiveness rating required subjective judgments,
these subjects' EV x evaluation correlation coefficients
were not notably high, and their weights were not so
similar as to suggest that each dimension was weighted
equally.
Differences between Probability and Rate Versions
Table 3 (p. 49) shows the mean attractiveness
ratings for each of the 27 duplex bets, for subjects
completing the probability and rate versions of the
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Table 3
Comparison of Mean Attractiveness Ratings fSDs^ of
Probability and Rate Versions of Duplex Bets
Game EV Probability Rate
1 " 1 . z U O AC— 3 .Ob ( 2 . b6
)
-2.75 (2.96)
£. • UU o c.2b ( J • 1 1 - . 86 (2,88)
-5 r\f\
-"J • UU _ AO~4 • U2 ( 1 • OH ) — 4 .44 (1.33)
A
. oU 1 . 4 y / O O D \( 2 * / o ) O £ 12.61 (2.41)
CD • UU • D
1
. y D ( 2 . b J )
cD 1 on1 • ^ U 1 OA1 . O 'i / O O 0 \ O T AJ . / U (2.-3/;
/ " • o u " J . 4 1 ^ 1 . o4 j
Q
• UU ""± • / u / O 1 A \ • . 4 D / O Q A \^ 2 . o U ;
y 1 OA— 1 . 2 U O AQ~ J • uy ( 1 . y / J "4 .61 / o c \( • '5)
10 — • 60 O OA— 2 . o 0 ( 1 . y J —_ O £ c"3 . 6D ( 1 . DO
)
11 • 00 c o ( 2 • DO
;
—
• 16 ( 2 . 06
12 1 OA1.20 O Q C2 • O D / O O 1 \( 2 • 2 1 j O Q 12 • o 1
13 2.40 2.70 (1.84) 3. 14 (2.24)
14 - 00 -1 . 03 (2.55) -.41 (2 . 18)
15 -.40 -2.46 (2.35) -2.41 (2.61)
16 .00 -1.31 (2.56) * • 06 (2.59)
17 .60* 1.32 (2.18) * 2.46 (2.18)
18 -.80 -2.76 (1.82) -2.82 (2.49)
19 .00 -.13 (2.20) -.33 (2.08)
20 .00 -1.61 (2.63) * -.28 (2.88)
21 .80 .22 (2.42) 1.06 (2.70)
22 .00 -.67 (2.20) -.54 (2.32)
23 .40 .49 (2.50) * 2.03 (2.23)
24 .40 1.95 (2.31) 1.38 (2.59)
25 -.40 -2.55 (2.02) * -3.94 (1.68)
26 -2.40 -3.76 (1.80) -4.29 (1.32)
27 3.00 3.84 (1.40) 4.01 (2.11)
* The expected value for this game is incorrectly listed
by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968, Table 2) as -.60.
* E < .01, 2-tailed.
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questionnaire. Eleven of the 27 comparisons show
significant differences between the means (t-test, e <
.01, 2-tailed; the more stringent level of significance
is because of the relatively large number of
comparisons)
.
Fifteen of the differences showed that
the item was rated more attractive in the rate version;
for the other 12 items, the item was more attractive in
the probability version. The mean attractiveness rating
over all 27 items was -.64 for the probability version
and -.48 for the rate version. The mean of the standard
deviations of attractiveness ratings across the 27 items
was 2.26 for the probability version and 2.22 for the
rate version.
Table 4 (p. 51) shows comparisons for other
measures on the questionnaire. The weighting of risk
dimensions for the duplex bets might be expected to show
differences between questionnaire versions, especially
given the differences on individual bets discussed
above. For all but one of the risk dimensions, money to
lose, there was a significant difference in average
weighting of probability and rate version items.
Notably, rate to win and rate to lose were both weighted
more heavily (.40 and -.46) than probability to win and
lose ( .25 and -.35)
.
To study individual differences in patterns of
weighting the risk dimensions, weights were converted to
z-scores, after reversing the signs of the two loss
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Table 4
Dimens ion Weights and Impulsiveness Measures: Comparison
of Mean s fSDs) for Probability and Rate Versions of
Questionnaire
Probabi 1 ity Rate
Dimension weights
Prob/Rate to win 25 I • 18) * • 40 1 • 15)
Money to win • 44 1 • 21) * 33 1 • 21)
Prob/Rate to lose • 35 1 • 19) * • 46 1 • 12)
Money to lose 35 1 • 25) 28 I • 21)
Z-scored dimension weights
Prob/Rate to win * 62 1 • 83) * i 02 (1 .02)
Money to win • 58 I • 83) * 4.00 (1 .04)
Prob/Rate to lose .02 1 • 93) * t.50 y • 86)
Money to lose <.02 (1 .03) * 1.52 1 • 81)
Impulsiveness measures
Self-report 3.. 12 (1 .29) 2 .92 (1 .26)
Decision scale 31..06 (3 .48) 31 .45 (2 .98)
9-item subscale 13 .48 (2 .07) 16 .44 (1 .69)
EIS - Total 20 , 15 (7 .46) 19 .98 (6 .90)
Narrow definition 2 .85 (3 .33) 2 .46 (3 .01)
Nonplanning 5 .66 (2 .52) 5 .66 (2 .20)
Risktaking 5 .79 (2 .53) 5 .52 (2 .43)
Liveliness 3 .06 (1 .64) 3 .26 (1 .61)
EV X Evaluation .58 1 • 25) .59 1 • 21)
Time 10 .76 (B .88) * 14 . 09 (7 .76)
* E < .05, 2-tailed.
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dimensions (probability/rate to lose and money to lose)
.
The reason for considering relative rather than raw
weights becomes apparent in comparing two hypothetical
subjects who both have a weight of .30 for the money to
win dimension. For one subject, .30 may be the highest
of the four weights, while for another it may be the
lowest. Comparing the raw weights is therefore not very
informative. Z-scores allow more meaningful comparisons
between subjects. ^ Mean (SD) z-scores for the dimension
weights for both versions of the duplex gamble task are
displayed in Table 4 (p. 51)
.
The z-scored dimension weights offer valuable
information by themselves. In the probability version,
probability to win had the lowest relative weights, and
money to win had the highest. In the rate version,
money to lose had the lowest weights, and rate to lose
had the highest. All of the differences between
versions are significant.
The only other significant difference between the
versions was for time to complete the duplex gamble
task. Subjects completing the rate version took more
time to complete the 27 duplex gambles (roughly 14 vs.
11 minutes; p < .05, 2-tailed)
.
2 Correlations with raw weights were also obtained.
For the probability version, raw weight of probability
to lose was correlated .30 with subjects' self-report of
impulsiveness, and .26 with the EIS definitional scale
(p < .01, 1-tailed) . For the rate version, there were
no significant correlations with raw weights.
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since none of the other variables (EIS, decision
scale, subject background) showed significant
differences, it is appropriate to combine data from
subjects completing different versions of the gambling
task for all analyses not related to the gambling task.
The correlations between impulsiveness measures and
background variables for the combined subjects are
displayed in Table 2 (p. 47)
.
Correlations
Variables Associated with Duplex Gamble Task
Because of the large number of relations tested,
and the unexpected direction of some relations, only
correlations significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
will be reported. There were no significant
correlations between dimension weights, EV X evaluation
coefficient, or time to complete task in the probability
version of the duplex gamble task and impulsiveness
measures or background variables (Table 5, p. 54)
.
For the rate version (Table 6, p. 55) , sensitivity
to money to lose was associated with more impulsiveness
on the definitional scale of the EIS (.33). The EV X
evaluation coefficient (a measure of the relation
between subjects ratings of the bets and the expected
value of the bets) was higher for younger subjects.
Higher impulsiveness as measured by self-report, and the
risktaking and liveliness scales of the EIS were
53
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associated with less time to complete the duplex bet
task (-.31, -.31, -.32 respectively). 3,4
Eysenck Impulsivity Scale
The EIS total score and subscales all correlated
significantly with subjects' self-reports of
impulsiveness, ranging from .24 for the liveliness scale
to .58 for the EIS total score (median = .48; see Table
2, p. 47). EIS total also correlated .22 with the 20
item decision scale, and the definitional subscale
correlated .30 with the 20 item decision scale and .33
with the 9-item decision scale (p < .01).
Decision Research Scale
Scores on the 20-item scale were correlated with
total EIS score (.22) and with the definitional EIS
subscale (.30). The 9-item decision scale was also
correlated with the definitional EIS subscale (.33; see
Table 2
, p. 47)
.
3 For each duplex bet in the rate version, a
correlation was obtained between each subject's
attractiveness rating of the bet and his or her scores
on impulsiveness measures (self-report, 18-item decision
scale, EIS total and definitional subscales) -A
comparison of average correlations for bets with high
and low rates yielded no differences.
4 Subjects were grouped according to which of the
four risk dimensions from the duplex bet task received
the highest weight. A 2 X 4 (guestionnaire version X
maximum dimension) analysis of variance was performed on
impulsiveness scores (self-report, decision scales, EIS
total and subscales) . There were no significant main
effects or interactions.
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Subject Background Variables
Regarding subject background variables, females had
more impulsive scores on the 9-item decision scale
(.21). Older subjects had less impulsive scores on the
definitional and liveliness subscales of the EIS (-.19,
-.59, respectively) and had higher SAT scores (.20).
Subjects with higher GPA showed less impulsiveness on
the EIS risktaking subscale (-.21; see Table 2, p. 47;
all correlations p < .01, 1-tailed)
.
Behavioral Examples of Impulsiveness
Subjects' responses to the open ended items "Please
describe an occasion on which you behaved impulsively",
and "Please describe an occasion on which you behaved
unimpulsively" (see Appendix E) were classified
according to the following categories:
Choices between Expressed Alternatives
This category includes examples in which the
subject indicates a choice between two or more
alternatives. Twelve percent of impulsive examples were
included in this general category. Nineteen percent of
unimpulsive examples were included.
Delayed Outcomes . A subset of the choice category,
this includes examples in which one or more of the
alternatives involved delayed outcomes. An example of
impulsive behavior in this category is "I should have
been studying for an exam but my friends were going to
pick apples". This category is similar to the
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definition of impulsiveness as a preference for small
immediate over large delayed rewards, represented in the
decision scale. Eight percent of the impulsive
examples, and 13% of the unimpulsive examples were
included in this subcategory.
No Reference to Delay . Other examples of choice
did not refer to delayed consequences, but to a choice
between simultaneous alternatives. For example "in an
airport . . . trying to decide whether to go to Boston
or NYC". Four percent of impulsive examples and 6% of
unimpulsive examples were in this subcategory.
The distinction between the above categories was
sometimes blurred . For example , "I skipped class and
went to breakfast instead" was classified as a choice
between present alternatives, even though skipping class
probably involves long-term consequences. In general,
if the subject did not refer to the future ("I skipped
class even though it might affect my course grade"), the
choice was considered to be between simultaneous
alternatives. The exception was for examples involving
homework (e.g. doing homework vs. going out with
friends) . These choices were assumed to refer to the
future consequences of doing homework, even if a future
exam or course grade was not mentioned. Presumably,
students do homework not for immediate benefits but to
get good grades, to avoid falling behind, or to avoid
the embarrassment of being unprepared in class. Many
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of the examples listed in the "future consequences"
category involved homework. Otherwise, references to
the future (e.g. "I wasn't sure if I would have enough
money for the rest of the semester") had to be
explicitly mentioned for inclusion in this category.
Decisions not Expressed as Choices
Most of the examples of behavior (88% of impulsive
examples and 81% of unimpulsive examples) were not
expressed as a choice between alternatives, but as an
action either taken or not taken.
Consequences . Examples in which the costs or
consequences of an action were expressed were included
in this category. For example, "I'll do a shot of hard
liquor without thinking about the after effects"
(impulsive) , and "Before I took the job I planned the
pros and cons of moving, including money lost or gained"
(unimpulsive) . This category is comparable to the
risktaking subscale of the EIS, or sensitivity to the
loss dimensions on the duplex bet. Seventeen percent of
impulsive examples and 19% of unimpulsive examples were
included
.
Planning . Examples of behaviors involving planning
or lack of planning were included in this category. For
example, "We were near a theater so we went to a movie"
(impulsive), and "Planned a ski trip months ahead of
time". References to planning were taken to include
thinking about and working on a decision, "it had never
59
occurred to me before", etc. This category is
comparable to the nonplanning subscale of the EIS.
Twenty five percent of impulsive examples and 45% of
unimpulsive examples were included in this category.
Time. Behaviors involving time or speed were
included in this category. For example
. .1
realized what a bum I was living with. I went home and
moved out within the next 12 hours" (impulsive) and
"Took me one year to decide if I wanted to vacation for
a week in Florida" (unimpulsive) . Examples were
included in this category if time was explicitly
mentioned (e.g. "at the last minute", "five minutes
later") . The liveliness subscale of the EIS focuses on
speed of decision making, and time to complete the
duplex bet task was considered in the present
investigation as a potential impulsiveness measure.
Forty-five percent of impulsive examples and 17% of
unimpulsive examples were included in this category.
The percentage of examples in each of the five
categories are displayed in Table 7 (p. 61) , in order of
frequency for impulsive and unimpulsive examples. Time
was the most important element of examples of
impulsiveness (45%) , and planning was the most important
element of examples of unimpulsive behavior (45%).
These two characteristics make up 66% of the combined
examples. Examples acknowledging consequences of
behavior and those expressing a choice
60
between alternatives were much less common (34% of
combined examples)
.
Table 7
Content Analysis of Subjects^ Examples of Impulsive and
Unimpulsive Behavior
Impulsive Unimpulsive Combined
Time
Planning
Consequences
Choice
45%
25%
17%
12%
17%
45%
19%
19%
30%
36%
18%
16%
No Delay
Delayed Outcome 8%
4%
13%
6%
11%
5%
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present study had two main goals. One was to
explore a new conception of human impulsive behavior in
which individual differences in sensitivity to rate
factors influence impulsive decisions. The second was
to find out how much agreement exists between
impulsiveness measures based on different definitions,
and drawn from different fields within psychology.
Four different kinds of questionnaire were used to
address these questions. The first was a task in which
subjects rated the attractiveness of a series of duplex
bets. The bets were designed to permit identification
of each subject's pattern of sensitivity to amount and
rate or probability of winning and losing. The second
questionnaire was a group of hypothetical choices and
judgments based on the decision theory literature.
These items were designed to assess individual
differences in subjects' preferences regarding delayed
outcomes of choice. A subset of the items specifically
pertained to choices between small immediate and larger
delayed rewards, that is, the typical definition of
impulsiveness in human decision making literature. The
third questionnaire was the Eysenck Impulsivity Scale,
composed of 42 items compiled by Eysenck and Eysenck
(1977) from other personality scales. The EIS breaks
down into four subscales: narrow definition of
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impulsiveness, nonplanning, risktaking, and liveliness.
Subjects also responded to a single 7-point rating scale
regarding their own impulsiveness. Finally, subjects
gave behavioral examples of impulsive and unimpulsive
behavior.
Before reviewing the results of the study, it is
useful to discuss some of the findings from subjects'
examples of impulsive behavior. in light of the
conceptions tested in the present study, it is notable
that few subjects described impulsive behavior as a
choice of one alternative over another, or as a choice
involving the loss of other opportunities. For example,
many subjects described an opportunity to take a trip.
They either went on the trip or did not, usually without
mentioning positive alternatives (e.g. staying home to
save money for a car)
. When alternatives were
mentioned, they did not always involve delayed
consequences. Rather, choices might be made between
simultaneous alternatives (e.g. going to the basketball
hall of fame vs. watching TV). Examples of unimpulsive
behaviors were often decisions against behaving
impulsively (e.g. not accepting a last-minute invitation
to a party) , in which case the alternatives are doing
something or not. Most of the examples comprising the
delayed outcomes category involved homework, where
delayed outcomes are implied, yet, as discussed in the
previous chapter, the delayed outcomes (e.g. tests or
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course grades) were rarely mentioned. It is possible
that homework serves as a secondary reinforcer — that
doing homework is itself rewarding as a result of being
associated with the delayed rewards of good grades,
being prepared, etc. In that case, subjects would not
have to look to the future to make decisions about doing
homework. A choice between doing homework and going to
a party may be, from the subject's point of view, a
choice between two immediate "rewards". In sum, there
is little evidence from subjects' behavioral examples to
support the definition of impulsiveness as a choice
between immediate and delayed rewards, or even as a
choice between two positive alternatives.
In addition, subjects ' examples of impulsive
behavior indicate that impulsive decisions are made
without consideration of costs and consequences. This
is not to say that subjects chose to accept the
consequences and behaved impulsively anyway, but that
such concerns did not enter into the decision process.
Even when consequences were acknowledged, subjects
rarely expressed regret or remorse in describing
impulsive behaviors, rather, they usually seemed pleased
at having seized an opportunity.
The conception of impulsiveness as the preference
for a small immediate reward over a large delayed reward
was extremely rare in the subjects' examples; similarly,
there were no intimations that rate of reward was an
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important aspect of impulsive decision making. (it
should be noted here that many subjects described
behaviors in some detail — including, for example,
times of departure, names of restaurants, other people
involved — so failure to mention alternatives cannot be
attributed simply to terseness on the part of the
subjects.) Both the duplex bet task and decision items
are based on the assumption that impulsive behavior
occurs in the context of a choice involving both gain
and loss. However, the subjects' examples are quite
clear on this matter, and their descriptions of
impulsiveness as a seizing of opportunity without
explicit consideration of consequences should be taken
seriously. Discussion of the other results of the
present study will consider the implications of the
subjects' conception of impulsiveness.
Eysenck Impulsivity Scale
The EIS as a whole was highly reliable (alpha =
.84) and intercorrelations among the four subscales were
high (.26 to .81). The subscales and total were all
significantly correlated with subjects' self-report of
impulsiveness (.24 to .58), and, for the most part
uncorrelated with background variables (there were three
weak correlations involving age and GPA) . Impulsiveness
as measured by total score and the risktaking and
liveliness subscales was associated with less time spent
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completing the rate version of the duplex gamble task (-
.27, -.31 and
-.32, respectively).
The high reliability of the EIS and its success in
correlating with self-report and time is perhaps not
surprising, given the origins of the scale. Although it
is possible that subjects were influenced by their
previous responses to the EIS when responding to the
self-report item, it is likely that the EIS itself is
essentially a more reliable self-report measure of
impulsiveness. The items in the EIS were originally
written on the basis of face validity in measuring
impulsiveness, were selected from various personality
questionnaires on the basis of face validity, and the
best items were retained in the EIS using the results of
factor analysis. Therefore, it would be somewhat
surprising if the scale were not related to subjects'
own definitions of impulsiveness.
In fact, subjects' examples of impulsive and
unimpulsive behavior were quite similar to the
definitions implied by the EIS. Speed of decision-
making ("liveliness", in terms of the EIS) was the most
common element found in examples of impulsiveness, and
planning was the most common element in examples of
unimpulsive behavior. The correlation between self-
report of impulsiveness and the risktaking subscale
could be seen as consistent with a conception of
impulsiveness as the failure to attend to consequences
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of behavior. Risktaking might be viewed as action
taken, not in spite of possible costs, but without
taking account of them at all.
Rate Preferences
Weights obtained for each subject for the risk
dimensions in the duplex gamble task indicated
substantial individual differences in preferences. This
was true for the probability version of the task, as
well as for the rate version.
The probability version was a direct replication of
Slovic and Lichtenstein's (1968) original procedure.
This task was not designed to serve as a measure of
impulsiveness, and as expected, there were no
significant correlations between dimension weights for
this task and scores on impulsiveness measures or
background information.
The rate version was designed to assess individual
differences in preference for rate of winning and
losing, as well as amount of money to be won and lost.
As predicted, weights for rate to win and lose were
greater than weights for the probability of winning and
losing (.40 and -.46 vs. 25 and -.35). This result
supports the hypothesis advanced in Chapter I, that
probability should be considered a special case of rate,
relevant only for behaviors and outcomes independent of
other opportunities. Also, within the rate version of
the task, rate of winning and losing were weighted more
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heavily than amount to win and lose (.40 and -.46 vs.
.33 and -.28). In the probability version, amount to
win was weighted more heavily than probability to win,
and amount and probability to lose were weighted
equally. Subjects appear to pay special attention to
rate, suggesting that rate information is a familiar and
relevant tool for decision making.
Considerations relevant to a series of choices are
more often appropriate than those applicable only to an
isolated event. This assertion can be illustrated with
an example from daily sports news: Charles Barkley, a
prized professional basketball player, has to make a lot
of decisions on the court. If he shoots every time he
gets the ball, he will make a lot of points. However,
although his points per game will be high, he will also
miss more baskets than if he shoots less frequently, and
he will be responsible for losing the ball to the other
team more often. Each opportunity to shoot affects
later opportunities, therefore, his shooting decisions
are linked to rate of reward. On the other hand, if
Barkley is holding the ball two seconds before the end
of the last quarter, his decision is not part of a
continuing series. His throw can only affect the final
score of the game; no other plays will be affected.
(This is a simplified example, in which "extragame"
rewards linked to success on the court, such as media
exposure, salary, and deodorant ads are purposely
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ignored. The difficulty of finding any behavior that is
completely independent of future behaviors itself
supports the significance of rate considerations.) Most
of Barkley's decisions on the court affect later
choices; his off-court behavior is probably similarly
interrelated.
Sensitivity to the amount to lose dimension in the
rate version was associated with impulsiveness as
measured by the definitional EIS subscale (.33). In
addition, for the rate version but not the probability
version, time to complete the task was correlated with
self-report of impulsiveness and EIS scales (-.31 with
self-report, -.31 and -.32 for risktaking and
liveliness, respectively) . A possible interpretation of
these differences is that the task involving rate
engaged the subjects' attention in a way that permitted
the expression of individual differences in
impulsiveness. The rate task required subjects to
imagine delays before winning or losing money. This is
comparable to a situation in which individuals made a
decision involving delayed consequences of choosing a
reward (e.g. not studying for an exam in order to go to
a party) . On the other hand, the probability task
involved immediate, one-time outcomes. Subjects'
different reactions to these situations may reflect
their responses to actual, everyday, decision
situations. Although weighting of the rate dimensions
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does not appear to be directly related to other measures
of impulsiveness, the task as a whole may have
represented a kind of choice situation relevant to
impulsive behavior.
It is possible that the task involving rate was
simply more difficult than the probability version,
requiring subjects to spend more time on each item, and
leading to more careful evaluations of each choice.
This idea is borne out by the data indicating that
subjects spent more time on the rate version. The same
information may also suggest that the probability
dimension was more difficult to comprehend, causing
frustrated subjects to pay less attention to the
probability dimension and focus on money to be won and
lost. However, a comparison of the sums of the absolute
values of the weights (see Table 4, p. 51) indicates
that subjects did not pay more careful attention to one
version. Disparity of the sums would have resulted from
higher weighting of most or all of the dimensions for
one version, indicating that more attention was paid to
that version in general. In addition, none of the
subjects (including pilot subjects, who were encouraged
to comment on the task) , expressed any difficulties with
either version. All had been given written instructions
and had completed three practice items before beginning
(and timing) the 27-item task.
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Despite the concerns mentioned above, the
suggestion that rate variables may be relevant to
subjects' decision making, and possibly to impulsive
behavior, should be taken seriously. Foraging studies
clearly indicate the importance of rate to survival
strategies of wild animals, and there is no reason to
believe that human and animal approaches to decision
making are totally disparate. Nonetheless, rate is
generally ignored in favor of probability factors in
human decision making experiments (and animal models of
human decision making) . The present study demonstrates
that it is possible to measure rate preferences in
humans without confound and that there are sizeable
individual differences in rate preferences. That these
differences play an important role in decision making is
suggested by the present results, and should be the
focus of further study.
Counter to expectations, it appears that, if
anything, impulsive subjects are most sensitive to loss,
particularly amount to lose (.3 3 correlation between
money to lose and EIS definitional scale) . Following
Gray's (1987) theory, it was predicted that impulsive
subjects would be most sensitive to reward. In
addition, sensitivity to punishment seems to contradict
the notion that impulsive individuals ignore information
about cost. However, the kind of decision described by
subjects and the decisions made in the duplex gamble
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task are quite different. The duplex bets are explicit
in the gains and losses to be expected, and the subject
is aware that he or she is supposed to use all available
information. However, in everyday life, individuals are
in control of framing their own choices, and are not
forced to consider all relevant information. It is
possible that impulsive individuals find cost
information highly disturbing, and avoid attending to it
when possible. When cost information is conspicuous,
the same individuals may weight it heavily. The
impulsive subjects who completed the rate task more
quickly than their unimpulsive counterparts were
responding to a situation in which they would
(hypothetically ) have to spend time contemplating losses
(the delay period before losing money) . They responded
in this situation by making faster decisions, and
concentrating on the losses they would be facing.
Decision scale
The decision scales, along with the subscale based
on a precise definition of impulsive behavior — that
is, a preference for a small, immediate reward to a
larger, delayed reward — were surprisingly unreliable
(.50 for the 20-item scale, .40 for the 9-item
subscale) . Both decision scales were correlated with
the definitional scale of the EIS (.30 for the 20-item
scale and .33 for the 9-item subscale, and the 20-item
scale was correlated with EIS total score (.22).
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However, low reliability limits the interpretability of
the decision scales, and suggests that the items, though
based on a simple and plausible definition, are not
measuring a simple construct in subjects' behavior.
It is possible that the "real-life" nature of some
of the decision items contributed to the inconsistency
of responding. Some items were based on situations
which may have been familiar to the subjects (dieting,
doing homework vs. going out with friends), while others
were more abstract (receive $100 now or $200 at a later
time) . Thus, subjects may have had a great deal of
information about how they would act in certain
situations, while for others they had to imagine their
behavior, possibly leading to idealized or unstable
responses. A more uniform sample of items measuring
preference for immediate vs. delayed rewards may yield
more reliable and informative results.
Delay of Gratification and Impulsiveness
The results indicate that hypothetical choices
between small immediate rewards and larger delayed
rewards (as measured in this study) are not strongly
related to one another or to more traditional
definitions of impulsiveness. Consequently, it seems
likely that a delay of gratification paradigm, which is
based on the same principle, would also not be
correlated with self-reports of impulsiveness (Mischel
rarely uses the term impulsiveness in connection with
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delay of gratification, but its similarity to the
decision theory model is undeniable) . The next question
to arise, then, is whether behavior in the delay of
gratification paradigm is more meaningful than responses
to the decision scale appear to be. In light of the
misgivings expressed above about the construct validity
of the hypothetical delay of gratification-type choices
used in human decision research, how is it possible that
Mischel's measure could show predictive validity?
Recall that waiting for the larger reward in a
delay of gratification paradigm at age four is
correlated with good grades, social competence, social
responsibility, ambition, etc., ten years later
(Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Mischel, Shoda &
Rodriguez, 1989). This striking result is evidence for
the stability and validity of the construct assessed by
the original single-item test. However, the delay of
gratification paradigm is based on the same choice as
the items on the decision subscale, which had very low
reliability. The lack of reliability and convergent
validity of hypothetical delay of gratification choices,
considering their face validity and the rather
spectacular performance of the original single-item
delay of gratification choice is surprising, and
indicates a special problem with subjects' knowledge of
their own choice preferences. In an unpublished report,
Mischel (1962, cited in Mischel, 1974) seems to have
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confirmed this discrepancy: he found that responses to
hypothetical delay of gratification choices, such as
between a cheap, new bike now and a fancy racing bike in
a month, were not correlated with choices in actual
situations, like choosing between cheap toys now and
more attractive ones in the future. Mischel's findings
indicate that subjects are poor at predicting their own
behavior with regard to delayed rewards, and that the
items on the decision scale could be inadequate
reflections of subjects' actual behavioral tendencies.
Again it is appropriate to consider the problem
with regard to the proposed explanation of impulsiveness
as a tendency to avoid framing a problem in terms of
potential costs, as a result of increased sensitivity to
punishing factors. In hypothetical situations, the
subject is not in control of framing the problem, and is
forced to take all information into account to at least
some extent. A subject who is sensitive to cost
information may weight that information heavily when
confronted with it, but, when possible, may frame
decision situations so that cost considerations can be
avoided. This would explain why Mischel's subjects
respond differently to hypothetical and actual choices,
and why subjects fail to predict choice behavior
accurately and consistently.
Mischel's research offers further evidence to
support this notion. Subjects who succeed in delaying
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gratification use strategies to avoid thinking about the
reward and the delay. Children could wait longer for a
larger candy bar if they focused on its shape or avoided
thinking about it at all, than if they thought about its
taste. The "impulsive" subjects avoided spending time
attending to costs (and experiencing those costs in the
form of frustration. "Unimpulsive" subjects framed the
situation such that costs (not having a candy bar right
away) were less apparent. It is possible that when
impulsive subjects are unable to ignore cost
considerations, they are highly influenced by them,
while unimpulsive subjects are able to confront the
punishing dimensions of a decision situation, and use
strategies to diminish perceived costs in order to
obtain their goals.
The correlation between delay of gratification at
age four and social and academic success at age fourteen
raises another interesting issue. Mischel (1974)
conjectures that early family environment can teach the
skills needed to wait for a deferred reward, and that
these skills pave the way for other kinds of
achievement. Individuals who wait for larger rewards
tend to come from middle and upper socioeconomic classes
and more achievement-oriented cultures. Conversely,
individuals who prefer immediate gratification come from
lower socioeconomic classes and less achievement-
oriented cultures. However, there are no doubt
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individual differences within socioeconomic groups, and
even within families. A purely environmental
explanation of individual differences in delay of
gratification appears to be inadequate, so it may be
helpful to look toward dispositional factors.
The ability to wait for a larger reward could be
associated with a willingness to defer to the perceived
values of society (patience, perseverance, "good things
come to those who wait", etc.). There is an implicit
moral element to waiting for a deferred reward in our
society, as there is to getting good grades, being
socially adept, and of course to resisting temptation.
Mischel (1974) himself suggests the moral element to
waiting for a reward when he refers to the type of
individual with a strong tendency to choose larger,
delayed rewards as showing the "Puritan character
structure", and coming most often from "Protestant
ethic" cultures (1974, p. 253). The ability to delay
gratification at an early age, and later social and
academic success are the manifestations of personal
morality in our society.
Some individuals may learn strategies for
minimizing the pain associated with delayed rewards in
order to attain the goals valued by society.
Individuals who value these goals to a lesser extent may
concentrate more on immediate goals, failing to learn
or
use strategies for dealing with cost information,
and
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avoiding such information when possible. It is of
course a long leap from the findings of the present
study to a conclusion that impulsive individuals are
hedonistic and antisocial, but this discussion is an
attempt to synthesize disparate patterns of results in
the study of impulsiveness. Firm conclusions cannot be
drawn from present results that are often counter to
expectations, but speculations as to their meaning are
an important step toward progress in understanding the
questions about impulsiveness and decision making raised
in this paper.
Conclusions
Three measures based on different conceptions of
impulsiveness were examined. Results indicate that,
although the same term is used to describe the behavior
assessed by each measure, they are not all clearly
related. This is not surprising, given the widely
different conceptions on which each measure was based,
but use of the same term (impulsiveness) suggests better
agreement. It is now appropriate to draw some
conclusions about each of the measures, regarding their
worth as measures of impulsiveness and as research
tools
.
Evsenck Impulsivitv Scale
The EIS was strongly correlated with self-report of
impulsiveness. Benefits of the EIS over a simple self-
report of impulsiveness are clear: the EIS has been used
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extensively, with norms available for large and varied
populations, and the four subscales of the EIS provide
useful definitions of impulsiveness. However, aside
from being a helpful equivalent to subjects' self-report
of impulsiveness, it is difficult to see how the EIS can
serve to further the theoretical understanding of
individual differences in impulsiveness. According to
Eysenck (1987)
,
impulsivity merely results from a
certain combination of central personality traits, and
by itself is not a worthwhile object of investigation.
In addition, Eysenck 's central personality dimensions
provide only a descriptive explanation of impulsiveness,
and lead to few testable hypotheses about the
psychological processes involved in impulsive behavior
or its origins. A measure like the EIS which is based
on a descriptive theory cannot by itself contribute to a
deeper understanding of the concept of impulsiveness.
Rate Preferences
Rate preferences were not directly related to
impulsiveness, although the rate version of the duplex
bet task appeared to activate subjects' individual
differences in impulsiveness as it corresponds to other
variables (time, EIS score) . This finding, as well as
the finding that subjects paid more attention to rate
information than to probability information indicates
that rate information is relevant to human decision
making. This evidence, while not conclusive, points to
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the necessity for further exploration of the place of
rate preferences in human decision making. This
neglected variable may prove important in permitting
comparison and synthesis of the animal and human choice
literatures, and promoting progress in human decision
making.
Decision Scale
Items like those on the decision scale have been
widely used (although admittedly not to assess
individual differences) , in research on human decision
making, with the assumption that the hypothetical
situations are equivalent to actual choices. However,
the results of this study indicate that not only are
verbal responses not a convincing substitute for actual
behavior, but that the responses are only weakly related
to one another. As discussed above, the difficulty may
lie in the situational nature of the items, but this
study produced no evidence that the verbal choices
between small immediate and larger delayed rewards in
the present study tap a useful psychological construct,
and little evidence that choices involving delayed
rewards are closely associated with impulsive behavior.
Despite the concerns just discussed, it may yet be
tempting to say that the small immediate vs. large,
delayed reward choice is still useful. After all, it
has been the foundation for dozens of published works
and has allowed comparisons between human and animal
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choice behavior. But the problems with reliability of
verbal choice items should not be ignored. The
behavioral choices used in operant studies have indeed
proved informative, but the results of this study call
into question the assumption that verbal responses to
hypothetical situations are related to simple behavioral
choices. Past investigations with this concept have
used only one or two items, with no attention to their
reliability. The current study represents the first
time some items (previously used confidently as
illustrations of impulsive behavior) have been tested
with subjects, and probably the first time more than two
of this type of item have been used together. Continued
attention to this type of choice should be accompanied
by more careful scrutiny of reliability and construct
validity issues.
Impulsiveness as Aversion to Cost Considerations
The examples of impulsive and unimpulsive behavior
contributed by subjects in this study point to a
possible definition of impulsiveness which contradicts
some premises on which the other measures were based,
but is helpful in accounting for data in this and
previous studies. In contrast to the common definition
of impulsiveness as a choice between alternatives,
characterized by elements of delay and cost, subjects
described behaviors that were characterized by immediate
opportunity, and rarely mentioned alternatives or future
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consequences. On the basis of these descriptions and
the relations between other variables in the study, it
was conjectured that impulsive subjects are highly
sensitive to information regarding costs, but that in
the presence of reward, they are averse to spending time
attending to costs associated with the reward. They
solve this problem whenever possible by framing the
problem in order to avoid the unpleasant considerations
of behavioral costs. Such a strategy may objectively
lead to undesirable consequences, but impulsive
individuals appear to disassociate the consequences from
the reward. This accounts for the rapid decision making
reported in impulsive behavior, the common belief (even
among scholars of personality) that impulsiveness
"lead[s] to trouble" and is contrary to "good judgment"
(Fowles, 1987, p. 421), the apparent insensitivity to
punishment displayed by subjects in some situations, and
the disparity between responses to hypothetical and
actual choice situations.
This conception of impulsiveness is an attempt to
integrate the results of the present study. Because it
is based on a number of unpredicted, even surprising
results, it is not conclusive, but requires further
replication and investigation. In general though, the
results of this study should serve as a caveat regarding
common definitions and measures of impulsiveness.
Different perspectives within psychology clearly
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disagree about the meaning of impulsiveness, and common
impulsiveness measures appear to be at best inadequate,
and at worst irrelevant to the explanation and
investigation of individual differences in
impulsiveness
.
Impulsiveness as a Unitarv Construct
The current investigation has been based on the
assumption that the term impulsiveness is based on a
single underlying construct, and that different
definitions and operationalizations of that construct
could be unified by the appropriate definition.
However, in light of the findings of this study and the
range of perspectives on impulsiveness, the possibility
that impulsiveness is not a single construct, but a term
encompassing many different, even unrelated, constructs,
must be considered. Such a situation is not uncommon in
academic psychology, although sometimes the discrepancy
between different constructs bearing the same label is
acknowledged. Memory is a familiar example of a
construct which is defined and measure in many different
ways. Different measures are not typically well
correlated, but this is clearly recognized and
explicitly discussed, with the result that what is meant
by the term memory is generally made clear each time it
is used. In the case of impulsiveness, investigators
using the term pay little or no attention to different
uses of the term, and do not attempt to clarify
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distinctions between usages preferred for different
purposes. Such failure to explicitly recognize
differences in usage is not problematic as long as the
segregation between different perspectives is complete.
However, scholarship requires familiarity with relevant
information from a broad range of sources, therefore the
existing lack of communication regarding impulsiveness
is inappropriate and counterproductive. Psychologists
using the term impulsiveness should be prepared to offer
a clear explanation of their use of the term, as well as
to contrast it with other usages. If impulsiveness is
not a unitary construct, findings from the many past
research directions regarding impulsiveness cannot be
compiled to further the general investigation, as was
proposed in Chapter I. But a more important obstacle to
progress lies in neglecting to appreciate the complex or
multifaceted nature of the impulsiveness construct.
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APPENDIX A
DUPLEX GAMBLE TASK: PROBABILITY VERSION
Please read these instructions carefully.
You are to imagine yourself playing the game described
belov« On the questionnaire you will see a series of these
games. You are asked to rate each one according to how much you
would like to play it.
The game is controlled by 2 spinners. One determines your
chances of winning some money, and the other determines your
chances of losing some money. Here are examples of the spinners
that might be used in one game.
WIN $1 LOSE $1
WIN 0 LOSE 0
To play the game, spin both spinners. In this game, you
have a .4 (40%) chance of winning $1, and a .6 (60%) chance of
winning nothing. You have a .2 (20%) chance of losing $1 and .8
(80%) chance of losing nothing. It's possible for you to win $1
and lose $1, win $1 and lose $0, win $0 and lose $1, or win SO
and lose $0.
.
On the questionnaire you are about to receive, imagine
yourself playing each of the gaunes shown. The amount of money
you can win or lose on each spin will vary, and your chances of
winning and losing will also vary. In the blank by each game,
write in your rating of how much you would like to play each
game. .
Try the three practice items on the next page, and make sure
you understand the game before continuing. Don't forget to write
your start and end times in the spaces provided.
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PRACTICE ITEMS
In the space provided next to each game, indicate how much you
would like to play the game, using the scale below:
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
strongly prefer
not to play
no
preference
strongly prefer
to play
WIN $20 LOSE S20
WIN 0 LOSE 0
Ask any questions you have before
starting the next page
start and end times in the spaces
provided.
Record your
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START TIME
In the space provided next to each game, indicate how much you
would like to play the game, using the scale below:
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
strongly prefer no strongly prefer
not to play preference to play
1. WIN $20 LOSE $20
WIN 0 LOSE 0
2. WIN $10 LOSE $40
WIN 0 LOSE 0
3. WIN $10 LOSE $40
WIN 0 liOSE 0
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
strongly prefer no strongly prefer
not to play preference to play
4. WIN $20 LOSE $10
WIN 0 LOSE 0
6. WIN $40 LOSE $10
WIN 0 LOSE 0
88
-5
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 ^2 +3 +4 +5
strongly prefer
not to play
no
preference
strongly prefer
to play
WIN $10
WIN 0
LOSE $20
LOSE 0
8 WIN $20 LOSE $10
WIN 0
WIN $10
WIN 0 LOSE 0
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 + 1 -f2 +3 +4 +5
strongly prefer
not to play
no
preference
strongly prefer
to play
10. WIN $10
WIN 0
LOSE $2 0
11 WIN $20
WIN 0
12 WIN $20
WIN 0 LOSE 0
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 ••3 +4 +5
strongly prefer
Iiat to play
no
preference
strong ly prefer
to play
13 WIN $40 LOSE $20
WIN 0 LOSE 0
14 WIN $40 LOSE $40
WIN 0 LOSE 0
15. WIN $10
LOSE $10
WIN 0 LOSE
0
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
strongly prefer
not to play
no
preference
strongly prefer
to play
16 WIN $40 LOSE $2 0
WIN 0
LOSE 0
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 + 1 +2 +3 +4 + 5
strongly prefer
not to play
no
preference
strongly prefer
to play
19 WIN $10
WIN 0
LOSE $10
20 WIN $40
WIN 0
21 WIN $40
WIN 0 LOSE 0
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-5 -4 -3
-2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
strongly prefer
not to play
no
preference
strongly prefer
to play
22 WIN $10
WIN 0
LOSE $20
LOSE 0
23 WIN $40
WIN 0
LOSE $20
LOSE 0
24 WIN $10 LOSE $10
WIN 0 LOSE 0
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-5 -4
-3 -2 -1 + 1 +2 + 3 +4 + 5
strongly prefer
not to play
no
preference
strongly prefer
to play
25. WIN S20
WIN 0
LOSE $40
26. WIN $20
WIN 0
27. WIN $40
WIN 0 LOSE 0
END TIME
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APPENDIX B
DUPLEX GAMBLE TASK: RATE VERSION
Please read these Instructions carefully.
You are to imagine yourself playing the game described
below. On the questionnare you will see a series of these games.
You are asked to rate each one according to how much you would •
like to play it.
Each game is controlled by 2 spinners. One determines how
long you must wait before winning some money, and the other
determines how long you must wait before losing some money.
After waiting the number of minutes shown on the spinner, you
will win or lose the indicated amount, and spin again. Here are
examples of the spinners that night be used in one game*
When you start to play, spin both spinners. Let's say the
win spinner lands on "3" ^and the lose spinner lands on "S". That
neans that in 3 ainutes you will win $1 and spin the win spinner
again. You will wait six ainutes before losing $1 and spinning
the lose spinner again.
Notice that after the first spin, you nay not be spinning
the 2 spinners at the same tiae. It is as if the game is a
combination of 2 small games, one in which you win every so
often, and one in which you lose every so often. It's possible
for you to win more often than you lose, or lose more often than
you win.
On the questionnaire you are about to receive, imagine
yourself playing each of the games shown for 1 hour. The amount
of money you can win or lose on each spin will vary, and the
waiting tines marked on the spinners will also vary. In the
blank by each game, write in your rating of how much you would
like to play the game.
Try the three practice items on the next page, and make sure
you understand the game before continuing. Don't forget to write
your start and end times in the spaces provided.
WIN $1 LOSE $1
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PRACTICE ITEMS
In the space provided next to each gane, use the scale below to
Indicate hov nuch you would like to play the game for one hour.
-5
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 -f2 -f3 +4 +5
strongly prefer no strongly prefer
not to play preference to play
1. WIN $20 LOSE $20
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START TIME
In the space provided
Indicate how such you
-5 -4 -3 -2
strongly prefer
not to play
next to each gane^ use
would like to play the
-10 ! ^2
no
preference
the scale below to
game for one hour.
-f3 +4 +5
strongly prefer
to play
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 ! ^2 •3 +4 +5
strongly prefer no strongly prefer
net to play preferenca
to play
WIN $20 LOSE SIO
WIN $20 LOSE $40
WIN $40 LOSE $10
9 WIN $10 LOSE $40
t-g -4 -1 -2 -I 0 ! +2 +3 *
•troivjly pf«for no •troixily |)»«>f«r
not l>*«Y |)i rf«sr eiic« • to |>lny
10, WIN $10 l-OSF. 07O
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 *2 -^3 +4 -f5
strongly prefer no strongly prefer
pot to play preference to play
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 -fl +2 -f3 +4 -^5
Strongly prefer no strongly prefer
not to play preference to play
16. WIN $40 LOSE $20
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 41 +2 +3 44 +5
Strongly prefer no strongly prefer
not to play preference to play
WIN $10 LOSE $10
104
-5 -4 -3
.
-2 -1 0 ! -f2 -»-3 -f4 ^5
strongly prefer no strongly prefer
not to play preference to play
22. WIN $10 LOSE $20
-5
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 -fl ^2 +3 +4 -1-5
strongly prefer no strongly prefer
not to play preference to play
25. WIN $20 LOSE $40
END TIME
i
APPENDIX C
DECISION MAKING SCALE
Scoring of each item is given in parentheses.
Where applicable, the source of the item is identified.
Items Involving Immediate vs. Delayed Rewards
You are going to receive a kiss from the movie star of
your choice. When would you prefer to receive it(Loewenstein, 1987)?
a) immediately (4)
b) 3 hours from now (3)
c) 3 days from now (2)
d) 3 weeks from now (1)
At the end of the semester, your psych professor offers
an optional final exam that could raise your grade, but
won't count against you if you don't do well. Taking it
would cut into your summer vacation by a couple of days,
but on the other hand you wouldn't mind improving your
grade. What would you decide?
a) take the test because your grade is more
important than a couple days of vacation (1)
b) forget the test and enjoy your vacation (2)
You are going to buy a used car. Please rank the
following characteristics according to how important
they are in making your decision. Place a 1 next to the
most important characteristic, a 2 next to the second
most important characteristic, and so on (Abelson &
Levi, 1985, p. 259)
.
Price
Safety
Appearance
Repair and upkeep
Extra features (stereo system, air
conditioning, etc.)
MPG
(For Price, Appearance, and Extra features, rankings of
1, 2, and 3 received a score of 2; rankings of 4, 5 and
6 received a score of 1. For Safety, Repair, and MPG,
rankings of 1, 2, and 3 received a score of 1; rankings
of 4, 5, and 6 received a score of 2.)
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Given a choice between two classes, which would
prefer:
a) a class that is boring but which would look
impressive to future employers (1)
b) a class that is interesting but won't look good
on your transcript or resume (2)
Which would you rather have (Abelson & Levi. 1985
244):
a) $5 (2)
b) a lottery ticket with one chance in 1000 of
winning $5000? (1)
You are embarking on a new career selling used cars, and
are choosing between two dealerships that would like to
hire you. At dealership A, you can expect to sell many
cars each month, but your commission on each car is
rather low. At dealership B, you will sell only a few
cars each month but your commission is high. Your
monthly income would be about the same, no matter which
dealership you work for. Assuming the working hours,
conditions, etc. are comparable, which would you rather
work for?
a) Dealership A (many sales at low commission) (2)
b) Dealership B (few sales at high commission) (1)
Items Involving Small Immediate
vs. Large Delayed Rewards
Would it be a good idea for you to enroll in a
"Christmas Club" -type account, which pays no interest
but keeps you from withdrawing money until a prearranged
date (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981)?
a) YES - good idea for me (2)
b) NO - not a good idea for me (1)
You have just won a contest. You can either receive
$100 now, or $200 at a later time. What is the longest
you would be willing to wait for the $200 prize?
(indicate days, weeks, months, years) (Ainslie, 1986, p.
138)
(Twelve months or more=l; 6-12 months=2 ; 0-6 months=3)
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If you decide to go on a diet, can you/do you stick to
a) YES (1)
b) NO (2)
I would rather get a small amount of something I wantedimmediately, than have to wait for a larger amount.
a) TRUE (2)
b) FALSE (1)
Your rich uncle wants to give you the car of your dreams
right now, but your rich aunt is trying to convince you
to wait a year. How much money will she need to offer
for you to put off receiving the car for a year?
$
($0-$4999=l; $5000-$19999=2 ; $20000 or more=3)
In a psychology experiment, you have a choice between
getting $5 just for showing up, and getting $20 for
doing nothing in an empty room for 30 minutes. What
would you do?
a) take the $5 and leave (2)
b) sit for 30 minutes and get $20 (1)
You have won a contest, in which the prize is $100 to be
received in 1 year, or a smaller amount of money to be
received immediately. Check the smallest of the prizes
below that you would be willing to receive now instead
of the delayed $100.
$10 (3)
$20 (3)
$30 (3)
$40 (2)
$50 (2)
$60 (2)
$70 (1)
$80 (1)
$90 (1)
In deciding between two restaurants in the same price
range, which would you prefer?
a) one with excellent food but a long wait between
ordering and receiving the food (1)
b) one with good food and a short wait (2)
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It s Sunday afternoon, and you're sitting down to workon a project due Monday morning. Some of your friendscome by with a tempting plan to do something fun withthem for the rest of the day. Are you more likely to
a) go with your friends, and let your class work
suffer (2)
b) turn down your friends, and do a good job on theproject (1)
Items not Included in Reported Analyses
At a party where you don't know many people, where would
you be most likely to sit?
a) in an armchair, to avoid getting stuck too close
to unpleasant people
b) in the middle of the sofa, so you can sit next
to new people and maybe meet someone
interesting
You are going to receive a painful shock. When would
you prefer to receive it?
a) immediately
b) 3 hours from now
c) 3 days from now
d) 3 weeks from now
Would you/do you like to play the lottery?
a) YES
b) NO
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APPENDIX D
EYSENCK IMPULSIVITY SCALE
Items are scored as follows: YES=1, N0=0, except where(R) indicates reverse scoring.
NO Do you often buy things on impulse?
NO Do you often get into a jam because you
do things without thinking?
NO Would you prefer a job involving change,
travel and variety, even though it might
be insecure?
YES NO(R) Do you like planning things carefully
ahead of time?
YES NO(R) Do you save regularly?
YES NO Do you enjoy taking risks?
YES NO(R) Would you rather plan things than do
things?
YES NO Do you generally do and say things
without stopping to think?
YES NO Do you usually make up your mind quickly?
YES NO When the odds are against you, do you
still usually think it worth taking a
chance?
YES NO(R) Would you make sure you had another job
before giving up your old one?
YES NO Can you make decisions quickly?
YES NO(R) Do you usually think carefully before
doing anything?
YES NO Are you an impulsive person?
YES NO Would you enjoy parachute jumping?
YES NO(R) Would regular health check-ups make you
feel better?
YES NO(R) When you go on a trip, do you like to
plan routes and timetables carefully?
Ill
YES NO(R) Are you slow and unhurried in the way you
move? ^ ^
YES NO Would life with no danger in it be toodull for you?
YES NO(R) Are you rather cautious in unusual
situations?
Do you often do things on the spur of the
moment?
^0 Do you often get involved in things you
later wish you could get out of?
YES NO Would you enjoy fast driving?
YES NO Do you prefer activities that 'just
happen' to those planned in advance?
YES NO Do you usually speak before thinking
things out?
YES NO Would you do almost anything for a dare?
YES NO Can you put your thoughts into words
quickly?
YES NO If it were practically possible, would
you like to live each day as it comes
along?
YES NO Do you get so 'carried away' by new and
exciting ideas that you never think of
possible snags?
YES NO(R) Do you prefer to 'sleep on it' before
making decisions?
YES NO Do you often change your interests?
YES NO Do you need to use a lot of self-control
to keep out of trouble?
YES NO(R) When on vacation, do you look for
relaxation instead of excitement?
YES NO Do you think an evening out is more
successful if it is unplanned or arranged
at the last moment?
YES NO Are you usually carefree?
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YES NO(R) Before making up your mind, do you
carefully consider all the advantages anddisadvantages?
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
Do you get bored more easily than most
people, doing the same old things?
Would you agree that planning things
takes the fun out of life?
Do you get extremely impatient if you arekept waiting by someone who is late?
YES NO Are you an easy going person, not
generally bothered about having
everything just right?
YES NO Do you often long for excitement?
YES NO Do you hate standing in a long line for
anything?
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APPENDIX E
SELF-REPORT AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Please circle the number which best represents howimpulsive you are in general.
i:^epresenr
very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 veryimpulsive
, .unimpulsive
?;puls!veLf
^'''''''^ occasion on which you behaved
3. Please describe an occasion on which you behaved
unimpulsively: i^cn tiu
Background information
Age:
Sex: M F
Class: Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior
Other:
CPA:
SAT score (combined math & verbal)
:
Major:
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